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R. Aboulaich1∗, A. Habbal 2 and N. Moussaid1
1 LERMA, E.M.I., Avenue Ibn Sina B.P 765, Agdal, Rabat. Morocco
2 LJAD, University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis, Valrose, 06108 Nice Cedex 2, France
Abstract. In the present paper, a general multiobjective optimization problem is stated as a Nash
game. In the nonrestrictive case of two objectives, we address the problem of the splitting of the
design variable between the two players. The so-called territory splitting problem is solved by
means of an allocative approach. We propose two algorithms in order to find fair allocation tables.
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1. Introduction
Let us consider the multiobjective program defined by
(M)min
x
{
f1(x)
f2(x)
}
, (1.1)
when the cost functions are concurrent, the problem (M) must be reformulated to make sense.
To this end, a classical approach used to tackle multiobjective optimization is to define a scalar
anzats, generally a convex combination of the multiple criteria. This approach introduces however
an arbitrary choice of weights. In the convex case, taking all possible optima obtained for all
possible weights yields the Pareto front, which is of high importance to understand the tradeoff
between competitive criteria. Unfortunately, the determination of the Pareto front is generally
very expensive. So, it could be of interest to reframe the multiobjective optimization problem as
a Nash game [2, 3]: we split the original design variable into two strategies, formally we denote
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x = (U, V ). Then we look for a Nash equilibrium, defined as the couple solution to
(P )
{
min
U
f1(U, V ),
min
V
f2(U, V ).
(1.2)
The main difficulty of the theoretic-game approach is the determination of the best, non arbitrary,
partition of the variable x into the artificial variables U and V . This question, the main concern of
our paper, is a nontrivial and difficult problem. To our knowledge, there are very few contributions
to the study of this territory splitting problem. In [4] De´side´ri proposes an algorithm of territory
splitting using the eigenvectors of the Hessian matrix of one criteria f1, which somehow plays the
role of a preferred objective. In the following we propose two algorithms in order to find a Nash
equilibrium using a splitting of the strategy spaces when no cost is preferred among others.
2. Splitting algorithms
Pure allocation tables are any elements P and Q from {0, 1}n that satisfy Pi + Qi = 1 for 1 ≤
i ≤ n. Mixed allocations are obtained by convexification of the set of pure ones. We also drop
the mutual exclusivity constraint, to allow both players to share the same variable. To split the
optimization variable, we construct a sequence of two tables of allocation P (m) and Q(m) in [0, 1]n,
and we use an auxiliary function f defined by (2.2) from f1 and f2. In order to construct the se-
quences P (m) and Q(m), and to determine the Nash equilibrium xNE , we propose the two following
algorithms.
2.1. Algorithm 1 (AG1), heuristic allocation tables
Algorithm 1. Step 1: Set m = 0. Starting from any initial guess x(0), y(0) in Rn, and ρ > 0 is a
constat descent step, compute P (0) and Q(0) by:
min
x∈Rn
f1(x), x
(k+1) = x(k) − ρ∇f1(x(k)), k ≥ 0,
P
(0)
j =
Σk|x(k+1)j − x(k)j |
Σk‖x(k+1) − x(k)‖
,
min
y∈Rn
f2(y), y
(k+1) = y(k) − ρ∇f2(y(k)), k ≥ 0,
Q
(0)
j =
Σk|y(k+1)j − y(k)j |
Σk‖y(k+1) − y(k)‖
,
(2.1)
then initially set.
x
(0)
NE = P
(0).x∗ +Q(0).y∗,
where x∗ is the solution tomin
x
f1(x) and y∗ the solution tomin
x
f2(x), the dot denotes the Hadamard
product. We now define the function f by
f(x) = f1(x) + f2(y), (2.2)
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where x = P (m).x+Q(m).x(m)NE and y = P (m).x
(m)
NE +Q
(m).x.
Step 2: Compute x(m)opt the solution to min
x
f(x) and update P (m+1) and Q(m+1) as follows
min
x
f(x), x(k+1) = x(k) − ρ∇f(x(k)), k ≥ 0,
P
(m+1)
j =
Σk|(∇f1(P (m).x(k+1) +Q(m).x(m)NE))j|
Σk‖∇f1(P (m).x(k+1) +Q(m).x(m)NE)‖
,
Q
(m+1)
j =
Σk|(∇f2(Q(m).x(k+1) + P (m).x(m)NE))j|
Σk‖∇f2(Q(m).x(k+1) + P (m).x(m)NE)‖
,
(2.3)
x
(m+1)
NE = P
(m).x
(m)
opt +Q
(m).x
(m)
NE,
while ||x(m+1)NE − x(m)NE|| > test, set m = m+ 1, redo step 2.
2.2. Algorithm 2 (AG2), optimized allocation tables
Algorithm 2. 1. initial step 1 as in (AG1),
2. given P (m) and Q(m), compute x(m)opt the solution to min
x
f(x),
3. solve the minimization problem min
P
f(P.x
(m)
opt +Q
(m).x
(m)
NE) to get P (m+1),
4. solve the minimization problem min
Q
f(P (m).x
(m)
NE +Q.x
(m)
opt ) to get Q(m+1),
5. set x(m+1)NE = P (m+1).x
(m)
opt +Q
(m+1).x
(m)
NE ,
6. while ||x(m+1)NE − x(m)NE|| > test, set m = m+ 1, redo 2.
We pay a particular attention to check if the Nash equilibria computed by the proposed algorithms
belong to the Pareto front, also known as the set of non–dominated strategies (the meaning is
obvious from the definition of the front) [1]. We set, fλ = λf1 + (1− λ)f2, λ ∈ [0, 1]. For each λ
we compute the optima, the set of which forms the Pareto front (at least in the convex case). Below
we present some numerical results obtained by algorithms 1 and 2.
3. Numerical results
We consider a simple illustrating case where f1(x) = ||Ax − b||2 for the first player, and f2(x) =
||Cx − d||2 for the second one, where A and C are two n × n matrices, and b and d are vectors,
that is n × 1 matrices. We observe that the two algorithms converge. In example 1, see figure 1
and figure 2, we obtain the convergence to a Nash equilibrium which lies on the Pareto front, and
corresponds to the optimum of fλ for a value λ = 1/2. In example 2, see figure 3 and figure 4, the
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best computed Nash equilibrium is close to the Pareto front but not on it. Moreover, it corresponds
to a strategy that is more advantageous for the cost f2.
Example 1. A = C = Id, b = [1,−2, 2, 9, 1, 2, 9], d = [5, 1, 3,−8,−6, 0, 4]
Figure 1: Pareto front and Nash equilibriums (AG1). Pareto front and the last Nash equilibrium
found by (AG1)
Figure 2: Pareto front and Nash equilibriums (AG2). Pareto front and the last Nash equilibrium
found by (AG2)
Example 2. A = tridiag[1,−2, 1], C = A; b = rand(n, 1), d = 10 ∗ b, n = 50
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Figure 3: Pareto front and Nash equilibriums (AG1). Pareto front and the last Nash equilibrium
found by (AG1)
Figure 4: Pareto front and Nash equilibriums (AG2). Pareto front and the last Nash equilibrium
found by (AG2)
4. Conclusion
Both algorithms yield successive iterations that lie close to if not on the Pareto front. Ongoing
work is in progress to address weak points such as the computational cost that must be lowered or
the heuristic determination of the allocation tables that must be at least statistically driven.
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